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he Declaration of Rights has been part of the
Constitution of Maryland since our first
constitution was adopted in 1778. For the great
majority of that period, the majestic provisions
found in that document served as the only
available protection for citizens of this State
against official abuse of power by their government.
The revolution in federal constitutional law over the past .
three decades has changed that. Today, the provisions of;,;the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States
apply to both state and federal governments. 1 The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also has
proven to be a fertile source for protecting individual rights,
such as the right to privacy, against state interference. 2
Those federal protections, backed by a full panoply of
enforcement agencies 3 and federal statutes4 , are so effective
that the need to have and study a state Bill of Rights no
longer is obvious. Nevertheless, I propose in this essay to
show that our Declaration of Rights retains vitality and
should be studied and thought about today for at least three
reasons. 5 It teaches us important lessons about our history;
it guarantees rights which may not otherwise be protected;
and it may be amended to identify and protect new rights
in the future.
The Lessons of History

'

and, as a corollary, they have "the inalienable right" to
change their government "as they may deem expedient."
There would be no Divine Right of Kings here.
Article 6 provides another example of the framers'
concern with authority. That Article proclaims that "all
persons invested with Legislative or Executive powers of
Government are Trustees of the Public . . . . " Now, this
if not a statement that is enforceable in any practical sense.
Vet, it conveys the need to hold accountable those entrusted
with power, a need that the colonists found so unsatisfied
in British rule. Article 6 also reminds us where enforcement
ultimately lies -like sovereignty, it rests with the People:
Wherefore, whenever the ends of Government are
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered
and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the
People may, and of right ought to reform the old,
or establish a new Government . . . .
Revolution should be a last resort, we are told, but
revolution then becomes a duty for, as Article 6
concludes, "the doctrine of non-resistance against
arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."
One other example shall have to suffice. Article 8
provides that "the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Powers of Government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other .... "That provision, written
in 1776 at the start of a civil war, has no counterpart
in the Federal Constitution, written a decade later, after
·the Revolution. Those assembled in Philadelphia in
1787 were keenly aware of, and sympathetic to, the
principle of separation of powers, but the doctrine is
only implicit in the document they produced. The framers
of the Declaration of Rights, with a war still to be fought,
felt the need to be more explicit about the dangers of
concentrating authority. 8
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The Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1776, as our
nation was beginning its rebellion against the arbitrariness
and despotism of the British government. 6 Its provisions-the rights it identifies--would be important, even if rendered
superfluous by the Federal Constitution, because they
remind us of what the Revolutionary generation thought we
needed to be protected against. No one who reads that list
of rights can avoid thinking about how governmental power
can be abused and how those abuses can be prevented. 7
This notion is captured at the very beginning of the
Declaration. Article 1 tells us that "all Government of right
originates from the People, is founded in compact only, and
instituted solely for the good of the whole ... "Maryland,
it is made clear, is not England where sovereignty was
shared with the King. Rather, the People alone are sovereign,

The Federal Constitution
Does Not Protect Everything

The Declaration of Rights may also protect rights
which the Federal Constitution does not. A very recent
example is Choi v. State. 9 The Court there was
3

4
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presented with the question of whether a witness had waived
her privilege against compelled self-incrimination, by
making an earlier statement to the police. The Court, after
discussing the case law under the Fifth Amendment, found
that even if the witness had waived her privilege under
federal law, "she certainly did not waive her privilege ...
under Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." 10
The privilege, in other words, can be asserted at "any stage
of the inquiry."
All too often, unfortunately, counsel (and the courts)
ignore state constitutional law in favor of federal laws, even
when the state provisions might apply. This is both
shortsighted and wrong. It is short-sighted because state law
may provide an answer not found under federal law; it is
wrong because it ignores a basic judicial responsibility: "(A)
state court should always consider its state constitution
before the Federal Constitution. It owes its state the respect
to consider the state constitutional question even when
counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time." 11
It is not enough, however, merely to raise a state
constitutional question. The meaning of the state constitution
also must be determined. Instead of a rote recitation, seen
all too often in opinions, that the state and federal constitutional provisions are in pari materia, the language and
history of the state constitutional clauses must be examined
to determine whether their meaning does, indeed, differ
from that of their federal counterparts.
A glance through the Declaration of Rights reveals a
·number of fruitful candidates for that analysis. Article 40
states that "the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably
preserved, that every citizen in the State ought to be allowed
to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all 3Jbj~c~~
being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. ·:}.'rbat . ,"'f
language resembles that of the First Amendment, but it
certainly does not duplicate it. 12 Are the semantic differences
real differences? Only a careful analysis of the history of
Article 40 can reveal that. But certainly, unless that analysis
is undertaken, one cannot say that Article 40 and the First
Amendment should be construed in pari materia. 13
Finally, there are some provisions which might guarantee
rights which would come as a surprise to those involved.
Article 41, for example, states: 'That monopolies are
odious, contrary to the spirit of the free government and the
principles of commerce, and ought to to be suffered."
Although this provision has been little used, it reflects a
belief, strongly held at common law, that state-granted
monopolies should not exist. 14 Judge Niles wrote in his
treatise that if the monopoly the state had granted to the

butchers of New Orleans that was in issue in the famous
Slaughter House Cases 15 were to be tested under Article
41, the butchers' monopoly would be found unconstitutional
under the Declaration. 16 A good attorney should be aware
that possibilities like this reside in the glorious provisions
of the Declaration of Rights. 17
A New Meaning

The importance of the Declaration of Rights, however,
does not rest solely with what it has meant, or even with
what it means today. Its importance also inheres in what it
can become. If the people of Maryland wish it, the
Declaration of Rights can be amended to guarantee their
protection from intrusion by the State. 18 A decade and a
half ago, for example, the Declaration of Rights was
amended by the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment. 19
Of course, an amendment could be controversial.
Consider Roe v. Wade 20 , which held that women have a
right to abort a fetus within the first two trimesters of
pregnancy. If the Supreme Court were to hold, as seems
plausible at this writing, 21 that a state may protect the fetus
(but is not required to) by forbidding an abortion, the
Maryland Declaration of Rights could be amended-if the
electorate deems it wise-to provide an express identification and guarantee of the right to have an abortion. 22
Conversely, the electorate-if it deemed it wise--could
amend the Declaration to forbid abortions. 23
Abortion, of course, is a controversial example. Less
controversial opportunities for additions to the Declaration
of Rights can be found easily. Environmental protection
leaps readily to mind. The immense and fragile resource
that is the Chesapeake Bay certainly could be placed under
a special category of constitutional protection, perhaps one
similar to the "forever Wild" provision of the New York
Constitution which protects the Adirondack Park. 24
Conclusion
The Declaration of Rights of Maryland teaches us about
the past; it helps protect us in the present; and it may extend
more protection in the future. Two centuries ago, our
ancestors realized the need to protect the individual from
the power of the State. May we never forget that need.
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Notes
There are some minor exceptions to this statement (e.g., the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of jury trials in cases involving $20 or more has
not been held applicable to the states).
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The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... "
13

E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).

Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md. I 12, 466 A.2d 486 {1983)
provides an example.

3 E.g., the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.

14 The common law believed in this strongly. See, e.g., Case of
Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).

2
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E.g., 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

5 There has been a renascence of interest in State constitutions in recent
years. See, e.g., Brennan, "State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights", 90 Harvard Law Review, 489 ( 1977); "Developments .\oi
in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harvard
Law Review 1324 (1982).
6

The Constitutional Convention met in the late Summer of 1776.

7
See generally A. Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law 12-14(1915).
Judge Niles' book divides the Declaration of Rights into four classes: A)
"Declarations of abstract principles"; B) "Exact duplications of provisions
found in the Federal Constitution"; "Limitations on the power of the State
similar to those prescribed in the (Federal) Constitution."; and D) "Concrete
rules peculiar to Maryland." Article 6 is an example of a "Class A"
provision. /d. at I 8. See also Rees, "State Constitutional Law for Maryland
Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights", 7 University ofBaltimoe Law Review,
299 (1978)
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SeeM. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation ofPowers 131-34
(1967).
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316 Md. 529 (1989).
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83 U.S. {16 WalL) 36 {1873).

16
A. Niles, supra note 8, at63. Judge Niles added that"therecan be
no doubt" of that result.
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17 This can also work in reverse; a provision of the Declaration might
no longer satisfy the Federal Constitution. Thus, the statement in Article
36 that "it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he
thinks most acceptable to Him ... ,"surely offends the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. See Rees, supra note 8, at 304-05.
18 Sturm, ''The Development of American State Constitution," 12
Pub/ius 57 ( 1982), for a discussion of recent trends in state constitutional
lawmaking.
19

Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 46.
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410

u.s.

113 (1973).

21
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 106 L.Ed.2d 410
(1989).

22 This formulation finesses the question of whether that right can be
found under existing provisions of our State Constitution, such as the Equal
Rights Amendment.
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/d. at 545. The Court relied on Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Mfl.
446 (1885), a case decided long before the Fifth Amendment was ~lied _;fo;:
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to the states.
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Obviously, any state amendment would have to conform with the
holdings in the Supreme Court. Also obviously, an amendment could take
a position between the polar extremes.
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Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights", 9 University of Baltimore Law Review 379, 383 (1980). The
author, a Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, gives a number of examples
where wise counsel sought relief based on the state rather than federal
constitution.
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